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Abstract: 
Chinese has been the fastest growing modern foreign language in British schools and 
universities in the last decade, due largely to the perceived growing importance of mainland 
China as a global economic and political power and the substantial investment in Confucius 
Institutes and Classrooms by the Chinese government.  This article focuses on how China’s 
geopolitical strategy of promoting Chinese as a global language has been received and 
implemented in the UK and how different groups of learners of Chinese have been differentially 
affected by the implementation of Hanban’s policies. Based on conversations with key stake 
holders of the Confucius Institutes and Classrooms including managers, teachers and students, 
as well as observations, we investigate the different motivations and ideologies of the different 
interest groups. We also examine the cultural elements that are taught in the CIs and CCs. A 
particular focus is on how ethnic Chinese learners in the CIs and CCs react to the teaching of 
Chinese culture. The effect of promoting Putonghua on ethnic Chinese students who speak 
other varieties of Chinese, and how “foreignness” is constructed in the CIs and CCs, are specific 
concerns of the present study. The study contributes to the wider discussions of language 
ideology, language attitudes, motivations for language learning and learner identity vis-à-vis 
modern foreign language education. 
 






For the last decade, there has been a general decline in the number of students in schools 
and universities in the UK studying modern foreign languages. Traditionally, French is the most 
widely taught modern foreign language in schools. In 2002, 341,604 pupils in England and Wales 
took GCSE French. GCSE, the General Certificate of Secondary Education, is an academic 
qualification awarded in a specified subject, generally taken by students aged 14–16 in England 
and Wales. By 2010, the number of pupils taking GCSE French fell to 188,688, down 45%. 
Many people attribute the decline in part to the increased pressure on university places and the 
lobbying by the business sector to encourage the take-up of single sciences in schools. The 
number of pupils taking single sciences surged over the same period, with entries for chemistry 
and physics GCSE up by 32% and biology 28% respectively. 
However, not all modern foreign languages suffer the same fate. Between 2002 and 2010, 
Spanish was up 16% while Mandarin Chinese was up 38%, although the total number of pupils 
taking GCSE Mandarin is only around 4,000. In 2010, the Secretary of State for Education, 
Michael Gove, set up a partnership with the Chinese government to train 1,000 Mandarin 
teachers for secondary schools in England. Speaking on a trip to China, he emphasized the 
importance of the language. "Offering every young person the chance to learn Mandarin will 
help to encourage mobility between the two countries, equip the next generation with the skills 
they need to succeed, and ensure the long-term success of our economy and society," he said. A 
2011 survey of employers for the Confederation of British Industry (CBI) found that of those 
looking for language skills, Chinese was the second most sought-after  (44%), after French (49%). 
The rise of Chinese as a modern foreign language in schools and universities in the UK 
needs to be set against a background of the rise of Chinese as a global language. In June 2004, a 
small class of Chinese learners in Tashkent, Uzbekistan, were told that they would become the 
pilot institution for learning Chinese language and culture, and that the institute would be named 
after the ancient Chinese philosopher, Confucius (551-479 BC).  Later that year, on 21 
November 2004, the first Confucius Institute formally opened in Seoul, South Korea. In less 
than 10 years’ time, nearly 400 Confucius Institutions (CIs) and over 300 Confucius Classrooms 
(CCs) have been established in almost 100 different countries and regions. The Office of 
Chinese Language Council International, otherwise known as Hanban, the organization that 
oversees the running of Confucius Institutes and Classrooms worldwide, proudly declares its 
ambition to establish 1,000 CIs and CCs by 2020, with at least 100 million foreign learners of 
Chinese. A visit to a local Confucius Institute is an integral part of the formal schedule by 
Chinese politicians and officials on their overseas trips. Six international conferences of 
Confucius Institutes have been held in Beijing, every time attended by high ranking government 
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officials. By now we are all used to not only headlines like English is turning into a language we native 
speakers no longer understand, due to the so-called free-form adoption by the Chinese, or Chinglish 
(Michael Erard, Wired Magazine, 16/07), but also Is Mandarin the language of the future? (BBC 
Online), The Mandarin Offensive (Wired), and Saying “Global” in Chinese (Foreign Policy). Indeed 
Chinese is the fast growing modern foreign language in schools and universities in many 
different countries across the globe.  
In the meantime, efforts are made to use language as an instrument in the so-called 
cross-strait relations between mainland China and Taiwan. During the 2008 presidential election, 
Ma Ying-jeou, the current president of Taiwan, made a campaign promise to establish a cross-
strait dictionary in order to facilitate cultural exchanges between the people on the two sides of 
the Taiwan Strait who use different Chinese written characters, different words and phrases and 
different pronunciations. In May 2012, the so-called cross-strait dictionary was published. 
Likewise, the State Language Commission of mainland China compiled a Global Chinese Dictionary, 
which was launched in 2010 by the former Singaporean President Lee Kuan Yew and the former 
Chairman of the Political Consultative Committee of the Chinese government, Li Ruihuan, both 
of whom are named as consultants in the dictionary. 
It seems clear that the promotion of Chinese is part of China’s geopolitical strategy and 
must be understood as such. And as part of this geopolitical strategy, different initiatives are 
carefully designed and implemented in response to local needs and characteristics: in countries 
that have had a traditionally friendly relationship with China, in countries that have had a 
traditionally not so friendly relationship with China, in countries with useful and substantial 
natural resources for China’s economic development; and in countries of political, military and 
strategic importance. There have been a number of studies examining the China’s policies 
regarding the promotion of Chinese (e.g. Gil, 2008, 2009; Paradise, 2009; Li, Mirmiranin and 
Ilacqua, 2009; Zhao and Huang, 2010; Yang, 2010). In this article, we are concerned with how 
China’s efforts in promoting Chinese as a global language has been received and implemented in 
the UK and how different groups of learners of Chinese have been differentially affected by the 
implementation of Hanban’s policies. In other words, this paper is not about the expansion of 
Chinese as a global language per se. Rather it is about the consequence of the deliberate and 
concerted policies and efforts to promote a particular variety of Chinese as a global language on 
its learners. The article thus contains three parts. First, we will discuss the motivations of 
promoting the Chinese language, especially Putonghua (see discussion of terminology below). 
We will look at some of the discourses surrounding the policies. We will also look at the 
motivations of those who decide to take up Chinese classes. Our focus is on the ideological 
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stances behind the discourses and the conflicts, apparent or potential, between them.  Then we 
will look at what cultural elements are taught in the CIs and CCs. A particular focus is on how 
ethnic Chinese learners in the CIs and CCs react to the teaching of Chinese culture. Finally, we 
will look at the effect of promoting Putonghua on ethnic Chinese students who speak other 
varieties of Chinese, and how “foreignness” is constructed in the CIs and CCs. The data are 
drawn from multiple sources, including “conversations” with key stakeholders and participants 
in various aspects of Chinese language teaching and learning in British schools and universities, 
as well as observations in Confucius Institutes and Classrooms. We hope that our discussion will 
contribute to the study of language ideology, language attitudes, motivations for language 
learning and learner identity vis-à-vis modern foreign language education. 
Before we go further, a consideration of names of the Chinese language varieties is in 
order. Modern Chinese comprises eight mutually unintelligible varieties, based on historical 
connections and geographical distribution. The English names such as Cantonese, Hokkien and 
Hakka are given to specific dialects of the regional varieties of Chinese. Mandarin is the English 
name for the northern variety of Chines. There is a standardized variety, known as Putonghua, 
which is used as the national language of mainland China. It is based on Mandarin but not 
entirely the same as Mandarin. However, the English name Mandarin is widely used to describe 
the standard variety spoken in Taiwan and Singapore as well, and is frequently used in scholarly 
publications and public dicourse as a convenient substitute of Putonghua. In this paper, we use 
Mandarin because that it the term that is commonly used to refer to the variety of Chinese that is 
taught in the Confucius Institutes and Classrooms in the UK. Hanban officially promotes 
Putonghua. But it accepts that the Chinese spoken by many of its teachers is not very standard. 
The term Mandarin is often used in the English documents and speeches by Hanban officials.  
 
Ideologies and motivations behind the expansion of CIs and CCs in the UK 
According to the Confucius Institutes Network UK, Hanban’s representative in London, 
there are 23 Confucius Institutes and 60 Confucius Classrooms at the beginning of 2013. They 
cover England, Scotland, Wales and North Ireland. The Confucius Institutes are located in 
universities, in partnership with Chinese counterparts. In most CIs, the director is appointed by 
the UK partner university, supported by a management board consisting of people from both 
the UK partner university and the Chinese partner university. The Chinese partner university 
usually provides some teaching staff at their own cost, but the majority of teaching staff are 
recruited locally. Each Institute is responsible for drawing up and managing their own budget. 
Hanban provides earmarked funds for specific activities rather than the general running cost. 
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The Confucius Classrooms were initially coordinated through the Specialist Schools and 
Academies Trust (SSAT), a government contracted organization to support specialist schools in 
England and Wales in particular. As the SSAT’s contract with the government ended in 2011, the 
network of Confucius Classrooms was transferred to the Institute of Education (IOE), 
University of London, in June 2012 to become the IOE Confucius Institute for Schools. It is 
essentially the national centre for advice on and support for the teaching and learning of Chinese 
and about China in secondary and primary schools. The exact number of students on the 
Confucius Institutes and Classroom programmes is unknown. The IOE CI for Schools claims 
that there are over 6,000 pupils registered on the Confucius Classroom curriculum. 
Hanban has never shied away from declaring its motives as i) the promotion of Chinese 
culture and language worldwide; ii) the promotion of trade ties; and iii) the extension of the 
Chinese Party-State's campaign of "soft power" into the educational sphere in foreign countries. 
While it calls itself a non-government organization, it is affiliated to China’s Ministry of 
Education and has close ties to a number of senior communist party officials. The current chair 
of Hanban Liu Yandong is a politburo member and State Councilor. Li Changchun, the 5th-
highest-ranking member of the poliburo standing committee, was quoted in The Economist saying 
that the Confucius Institutes were “an important part of China’s overseas propaganda set-up”—
a statement that has been seized upon by critics as evidence of a politicized mission (A message 
from Confucius; New ways of projecting soft power, The Economist. 22 Oct 2009. 
http://www.economist.com/node/14678507 Retrieved on 12 February 2013). 
It is clear from Hanban’s various policy documents and the speeches by Hanban officials at 
the annual Confucius Institutes conferences that the CIs and CCs are not entirely academic and 
educational organizations. They also have the goal of helping China to improve its image abroad 
and to alleviate concerns of a ‘China threat’ in the context of the country's increasingly powerful 
economy and military (Star, 2009). An article published by the American Council of Foreign 
Relations has argued that the Confucius Institutes are part of the initiative where "Beijing is 
trying to convince the world of its peaceful intentions, secure the resources it needs to continue 
its soaring economic growth, and isolate Taiwan." (Pan, 2006).  Some of the most frequently 
occuring words and phrases in the Hanban documents and speeches are: 弘扬中华文化 
(promote Chinese culture), 促进世界和平 (facilitate world peace), 增强友谊 (enhance 
friendship). 
Here, it is worth mentioning that the naming of the institutes after the ancient Chinese 
philosopher Confucius is clearly an attempt to claim the historical root and continuity as well as 
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the legitimacy in representing the traditional Chinese culture, and to dissociate the current regime 
in China from the anti-Confucius campaigns both during the 1912 New Culture Movement 
under the Nationalists’ government and in 1973 during Mao’s Cultural Revolution. In recent 
decades, interests in pre-modern Chinese culture and in Confucius in particular have seen a 
major resurgence in mainland China. Confucius temples have been rebuilt all over the country; 
his birthdays are marked by elaborate ceremonies; and his teachings are reinterpreted and 
reproduced. A massive statue has been erected on the side of the Tiananmen Square at the heart 
of Beijing, in front of the National Museum. All of these can be seen as what Hobsbawm called 
the “invention of tradition” - a deliberate creation and promulgation that implies a connection 
with the past for present personal, commercial, political, or national self-interest (e.g. Hobsbawm 
and Ranger, 1980). Indeed, the Vice-Chair of Hanban, Chen Jinyu, admitted that the use of 
Confucius’ name is to create a brand. She said, "With regards to the operation of Confucian 
Institutes, brand name means quality; brand name means returns. Those who enjoy more brand 
names will enjoy higher popularity, reputation, more social inﬂuence, and will therefore be able 
to generate more support from local communities." (Starr, 2009: p. 69). 
From the Chinese partner universities’ point of view, the motivations for setting up 
Confucius Institutes overseas may be more pragmatic. We spoke to the representatives of three 
Chinese universities that have established Confucius Institutes in the UK and the managers in 
the institutes. All of them mentioned the funding that Hanban was giving to the CIs. They felt 
that it was an opportunity that they could not afford to miss. Two of them also stressed the 
employment opportunities for their graduates and one of them said that they were using the CI 
as a staff development opportunity so that some of their staff who had not had a chance to study 
outside China could spend some time overseas. They were of course very aware of what Hanban 
wanted them to do. But they generally had a very pragmatic view of what can be achieved, in 
terms of promoting Chinese culture and improving China’s image globally, through the teaching 
of Chinese. One of the managers said, 
 
‘They (referring to the UK students) believe what they believe. You can’t change their 
views within a few weeks of teaching them some basic Chinese. Many of them don’t even 
know where China is. They can’t distinguish Asia from Africa. And they think Chinese and 
Arabic are all linked, and we write from right to left. If they learn some basic phrases and 
are able to say hello to a Chinese person, then that’s good. They can probably get a job by 




Some critics of the Confucius Institutes suggest that the initiative has been motivated in part of a 
linguistic, and perhaps also cultural, ideology that the Chinese language has some inherent power 
to change the minds of its learners (Brady, 2011). There is certainly a great deal of scientific 
research that seems to show that Chinese language users involve more brain areas, especially the 
right temporal lobe, when processing the language (e.g. Wellcome Trust Report 2003. 
http://www.wellcome.ac.uk/News/Media-office/Press-releases/2003/WTD002864.htm), that 
learning Chinese written characters aids the development of motor skills, learning shapes and 
letters, and the visual identification of graphics (Bounds, 2010 reporting research from Indiana 
University), and that there is a correlation between the learning of Chinese and math skills (Tang 
et al. 2006). These findings have been seized upon by the popular press and the language purists 
in China in constructing and spreading the myth of the ‘scientific nature’ of the Chinese language. 
Elsewhere we have examined how the myth has influenced the everyday thinking and behaviour 
of Chinese parents who insist on their children’s learning of Chinese in particular ways as they 
believe that the language could give its users certain cognitive advantage (Li Wei and Zhu Hua, 
2011). The myth seems to have led to another popular belief that those who take the trouble to 
study Chinese will be more sympathetic to China’s perspectives. There was much discussion in 
the Chinese press that one of the reasons that Chris Patton, the last British Governor of Hong 
Kong, was hostile to mainland China was because, unlike previous British governors of the 
colony, he did not speak Chinese, therefore did not understand the Chinese culture and the 
mentality of the Chinese people (Flowerdew, 2012). And more recently Gary Locke, the US 
Ambassador to China, has been called a "fake foreign devil who cannot even speak Chinese." 
despite his ethnic Chinese origin 
(http://behindthewall.nbcnews.com/_news/2012/03/23/10644657-not-chinese-enough-in-
china-chinese-americans-caught-between-2-worlds?lite). However, in the conversations we had 
with the managers and teachers in the Confucius Institutes and Classrooms, none of them 
mentioned such beliefs. In fact, when we specifically raised the issue of the ‘scientific nature’ of 
the Chinese language, one of the teachers responded, 
 
‘We are teaching them very basic Chinese, some greetings and phrases. We teach them 
some characters that they can remember because they are more like pictures. I don’t think 
it’s going to change their brain functions. They will have to be very advanced readers to be 




The majority of the individuals working for and in the Confucius Institutes and Classrooms 
do not seem to believe that Chinese language teaching would create a new cohort of China 
sympathizers. They think that their job is to give the learners some basic knowledge of the 
Chinese language and culture and to raise their interest in things Chinese.  
Interestingly, the British partners seem to share such views. In our conversations with three 
British representatives in the Confucius Institutes and Classrooms, none of them seemed to 
think that the teaching and learning of Chinese language and culture would produce China 
sympathizers. In fact, one of the directors of a Confucius Institute said, 
 
‘That (referring to the belief that Chinese language learners are more sympathetic towards 
China) is a very simplistic and naïve view. We teach a whole range of languages in our 
university and have done so for many decades. There is no evidence that our students are 
necessarily more sympathetic towards any particular country or culture. They may 
understand it more, because they know the language. But they are definitely not persuaded 
by the politics. In fact, I know people who learned Russian and are very opposed to the 
Soviet Union and to what’s going on in Russia now.’ 
 
They all said that a general awareness of the Chinese language and culture and an increased 
interest in Chinese and China was what they wanted to see through the CIs. It is true that there 
has not been the same kind of backlash witnessed in the USA regarding the expansion of 
Confucius Institutes and Classrooms or the controversies regarding the policies and practices in 
some of the organizations. When a China expert at the London School of Economics raised 
concerns about hosting the Confucius Institute on campus in the wake of scandal over LES’s 
dealing with the Gaddafi’s regime in Libya, he was accused of having an ‘outdated cold war 
mentality’ by the Chinese ambassador in London, who insisted that the Confucius Institutes and 
Classrooms ‘aided mutual understanding and friendship as well as providing language and 
cultural training’. A spokesman for the LSE responded by saying that "the Confucius Institute 
for Business at LSE focuses on business language teaching, for which there is great demand, as 
well as cultural events – most of them open to the public. No one at our Confucius Institute has 
ever experienced any attempts to stifle discussion or inquiry. Each Confucius Institute has a 
Chinese partner university and ours is Tsinghua, one of China's most prestigious universities. 





Similarly, pragmatic considerations seem to be a main motivation for universities and schools 
in the UK to want to set up Confucius Institutes and Classrooms on their premises, as Hanban 
provides substantial start-up funds and supplies teachers and teaching material for free, offers 
training opportunities and makes available further funds for specific activities and events. One 
locally appointed manager of a Confucius Institute remarked, 
 
‘They (i.e. Hanban) gives us money and textbooks. Our partner university in China sends 
teachers. We charge fees to the students who take Chinese lessons. We can ask for more 
money from Hanban to organize events for the students, to send them on study tours to 
China. Where else can you get such a deal?’ 
 
One of the Assistant Head Teachers of a school where there is a Confucius Classroom 
admitted that the free supply of teachers and teaching material was a major attraction for the 
school to bid for the Confucius Classroom. She said, 
 
‘We get support from both sides (i.e. Britain and China). The Department of Education is 
keen to support the initiative. There is special fund for new languages such as Chinese. 
And our Chinese partner send wonderful teachers to us. We are very happy.’ 
 
From the learners’ perspective, the motivations for choosing to take Chinese lessons are very 
diverse. Of the six school children from one Confucius Classroom, all between the age of 12 and 
14, whom we spoke to, four said that they wanted to learn something different. Two of them 
said specifically that they were good at learning languages and wanted to try a new language. One 
pupil said she had Chinese neighbours and wanted to learn the language to communicate with 
them. Three said they were interested in Chinese culture and the examples they gave included 
Kung Fu, Tai Chi, fan dance, and Chinese food. There was one ethnic Chinese pupil, whose 
family are Cantonese first language speakers. He chose to take Mandarin lessons at school 
because the parents said that it would be useful to learn Mandarin. None of them mentioned that 
they were learning Chinese in order to enhance their future job prospect, although when we 
specifically asked the question, most of them were aware of the media talk of the growing 
economic and political power of China. 
The university students who choose to take Chinese lessons at the various Confucius 
Institutes seem to have even more diverse motivations. We talked to 14 non-ethnic Chinese 
students from three different Confucius Institutes at length about their motivations and 
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experience of learning Chinese. Only two of them repeated the public discourse that Chinese is 
important because China is a rising world power and the language will be useful for future 
employment. One student expressed his desire to use his linguistic skills for social change, 
 
‘I want to do something about the terrible situation with the abandoned girls because of 
the one-child policy, and migrant workers who are abused. I want to talk to them in person. 
The Chinese government isn’t doing anything for them. And as far as I can tell, nobody in 
China cares. I want to help them. But I need the language to be able to help them.’ 
 
Most of the students we spoke to said that they wanted to learn another language because 
they were good at languages generally and learning Chinese would be an interesting personal 
challenge for them. One of them even cited the widely publicized research by psycholinguistics 
that showed cognitive advantages of being bilingual and multilingual. This is in contrast to the 
absence of such views articulated by the teachers. Five of them gave specific personal reasons for 
them to choose to take Chinese lessons, including having a partner or close friend who is 
Chinese, having Chinese neighbours, wanting to have a holiday in China, and not wanting to do 
a full degree in Chinese but wanting to learn the language nevertheless. Only one specifically said 
that he loved Chinese food and Chinese culture and wanted to be able to communicate when he 
goes to Chinese restaurant or watches a Chinese movie. 
There is a group of students attending Chinese classes in the Confucius Institutes who are 
ethnic Chinese. The majority of them tend to be speakers of varieties of Chinese other than 
Mandarin. Some are British-born Chinese students who attended Chinese community schools 
when they were younger but only learned Cantonese. We talked to four of such students about 
their motivations for doing Mandarin Chinese at the Confucius Institute. Interestingly, it was this 
group of learners who seem to have bought the public discourse about China’s rising as a world 
power. All of them independently talked about their perceived usefulness of Mandarin 
specifically for their future employment. Many of them also expressed a desire to identify 
themselves as Chinese and with other Chinese people. One said, 
 
‘So many people are learning Chinese now. I feel quite embarrassed not being able to 






‘My parents speak Cantonese. I can speak some Cantonese too. But Mandarin is more 
useful now because China is growing stronger. There are so many students from mainland 
China. They all speak Mandarin.’ 
 
One student told us, 
 
‘I want to learn to read and write Chinese better. I didn’t learn very much at the Chinese 
school. It’s not good for a Chinese not to be able to read or write Chinese characters. My 
friends from China can all read and write Chinese. They send me emails and text messages 
in Chinese. But I can’t read them.’ 
 
It seems clear that different political, cultural and linguistic ideologies underlie the different 
motivations expressed by the stake holders and learners. What is interesting is that the 
institutional ideologies of Hanban do not readily translate into practice by the key stakeholders 
including the managers and teachers of the CIs and CCs. What seems even more interesting is 
that different groups of learners choose to learn Chinese, especially Mandarin, for very different 
reasons of personal experiences and trajectories. The overall lack of reference to the global 
economy, job market and migration is the students’ discourse, especially that of the non-ethnic 
Chinese students, was quite striking and unexpected. It seems that their motivation for learning 
Chinese is primarily local and more immediate to their personal circumstances. Although the 
ethnic Chinese students did mention the rising power of China and the perceived importance of 
the language, their main reason for taking the Chinese lessons was also more personal and 
immediate, to avoid embarrassment or to be able to communicate more effectively with their 
friends. 
 
(Re)Presenting Culture and the culture authenticity 
 In Hanban’s discourse,  there is much talk about culture: promoting the Chinese culture 
through teaching the Chinese language, and developing and raising awareness of the Chinese 
culture. What exactly is meant by ‘culture’ in this context? How is culture taught in the Confucius 
Institutes and Classrooms in the UK? We probed these questions in our conversations with our 
participants of the present study. It seems that most of the manager, teachers and learners share 




 Hanban officials are particularly careful not to be seen to be exporting political beliefs 
and values through the teaching in the Confucius Institutes and Classrooms. In our meeting with 
one of the Hanban officials on a visit to the UK, we asked specifically what he wanted the CI 
and CC students to learn about the Chinese culture. He emphasized the ‘basic knowledge of 
Chinese history and geography’, and the ‘traditional cultural customs’ of the Chinese people. He 
admitted that he believed that teaching the British students about the ‘long, ‘unbroken history of 
China would help them to appreciate why unity is important to the Chinese people’. But  
 
‘at an elementary level, all we can do is to teach them the differences in customs between 
the Chinese and foreigners. At an advanced level, we can teach them that there are 
different ethnic groups in China. Each province and region has its own traditions and 
customs.’ 
 
So whilst the ideological stance is one of the Chinese government’s ‘unity in diversity’, the focus 
is more narrowly focused on traditional customs and everyday social practices. 
 For the managers and teachers in the Confucius Institutes and Classrooms, the objective 
appears to be very modest. The teachers of the Confucius Classroom that we studied seemed to 
have constructed a notion of the Chinese culture to accommodate what the pupils said they 
wanted to learn, e.g. Kung Fu, Tai Chi, fan dance, Chinese food, plus what they believed were 
the must-know facts of China, e.g. the Terracotta Army, the Great Wall, pandas, etc. 
Occasionally there were attempts to teach a short poem in Chinese such as the well-know Tang 
poem ‘Sympathy for the Peasants (悯农) or Li Bai’s (701-762 AD) ‘Thought on a Still Night’ (静
夜思). But they are usually taught without much contextual information or information about 
the poets. One of the teachers said to us, when asked about what Chinese cultural elements she 
taught in her class, half-jokingly but tellingly, ‘Kung Fu Panda’.  
 We did, however, observe a number of instances where ‘traditions’ were ‘invented’ in an 
apparent attempt to present the Chinese culture. One teacher gave out a red badge to a pupil at 
each session and the pupil would have to lead the whole-class recital of a text they learned in the 
previous session. She told the pupils that this was what happened in her class when she was a at 
school in China learning English. Several teachers asked the class to stand up at the beginning 
and end of each session and greeted the teacher in Chinese. 
 At the Confucius Institutes in the universities, the cultural element seemed less simplistic 
and cliché. There was quite a lot of teaching of ‘traditional customs’ such as gift giving and 
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acceptance, compliment paying and response, and kinship terms as address terms. They were 
well integrated into language teaching, and there are attempts to explain the origins of some of 
the customs. There were also attempts to explain how customs may vary in different parts of 
China. We observed classroom discussions of what is meant to be ‘friendly’ and ‘warm’ in the 
Chinese cultural context and of the Chinese notion of ‘face’. We observed one incidence when 
the teacher was talking about the meaning of ‘the family’ with reference to multi-generational 
extended families, one student asked about the one-child policy. The teacher first responded by 
saying that she was the only child in her family and she could not see anything wrong with the 
policy. When the student wanted to pursue it further, the teacher said that it had nothing to do 
with the language structures she was teaching and she refused to be engaged in any further 
discussion. 
It has to be said that the majority of the students did not seem to want to be taught 
anything beyond what was in the textbooks and what the teachers were offering to teach. Some 
of them explicitly rejected the idea of learning culture through learning language and seemed to 
believe that language and culture were separate things. One student we talk to said, 
 
‘I want to learn the language and to know what to say when I meet Chinese people in 
different contexts. I can read about Chinese culture and history and all that in my spare 
time. I don’t want to waste time in the class to be taught anything that I can read myself.’ 
  
Another student said, 
 
‘I know it’s pretty basic. But that’s OK. I want to be able to communicate in Chinese at a 
basic level. If I go to China, I can learn about the Chinese culture there. It’s more 
authentic.’ 
 
The issue of authenticity as raised by the last student commentator is an interesting and 
important one. This particular individual seemed to think that the Chinese culture (re)presented 
by the teacher was inauthentic, and one had to go to China to experience authentic Chinese 
culture. What seems to be at issue is the role of the teacher in mediating the learning of culture 
(see Kramsch, 1998, 2012). Many of the teachers only have a superficial knowledge of the 
Chinese culture, including the traditional customs that they sometimes try to teach. They often 
get the facts wrong, and cannot explain the origins or reasons for certain traditions. One example 
is when a female Chinese teacher in her late twenties asked her class what they knew about the 
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traditional Chinese customs for the Spring Festival, i.e. Chinese New Year, a student replied that 
children get 红包(hongbao, ‘red envelops with money’). The teacher corrected the student by 
saying that hongbao was what you get as a bonus if you are an employee in a big company for a 
job well done. She was apparently unaware that the term hongbao could be used for both the 
Chinese New Year red envelops and bonus. Some commentators in China have remarked on the 
young Chinese language teachers’ lack of knowledge of the Chinese culture. One senior 
professor of the university that sends teachers to one of the Confucius Institutes that we studied 
said to us, 
 
‘They are youngsters, freshly out of university. They want to be modern, fashionable, and 
western. What do they know about Chinese culture?! What do they know about China?! 
They want to be Chinese teachers, because they want to go overseas. They can’t teach 
Chinese culture.’ 
 
The authenticity of the culture (re)presented by the teachers in the Confucius Institutes has 
also been questioned by the ethnic Chinese students. As we said earlier, most of these students 
are attending the Chinese class because they are speakers of varieties of Chinese other than 
Mandarin or because they are British-born and did not have the opportunity to learn to read and 
write Chinese. However, they have experienced authentic Chinese culture in their own families 
and communities. As the cultural critic Ien Ang said about her own experience, she knew what 
was good Chinese food and what was not; and she would not be cheated with regard to cultural 
customs, even though she did not speak the language (2001). Elsewhere we examined an 
example from a classroom exchange in a Chinese complementary school where the Mandarin 
teacher from mainland China was unaware of the Chinese term曲奇(Cantonese: kuk-kei, 
Mandarin: quqi) was a Cantonese transliteration of the English word cookie and insisted on 
teaching the Mandarin pronunciation to the total puzzlement of the Cantonese-speaking pupils. 
Similar examples were observed in the Confucius Institutes, although the ethnic Chinese 
students tended to be too polite to point out the teachers’ lack of knowledge (Li Wei, 2013). 
Another interesting example from the Confucius Institute classes that we observed was the 
ethnic Chinese students’ awareness of ‘good handwriting’. Chinese first language users have been 
acculturated into an appreciation of the aesthetics of handwriting, which includes balance of the 
different component parts, the flow of the strokes, the shape of the character and the space it 
occupies relative to other characters, etc. Stanley-Baker (2010) describes Chinese writing as ‘sheer 
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life experienced through energy in motion that is registered as traces on silk or paper, with time 
and rhythm in shifting space its main ingredients’. The Chinese believe that handwriting is a 
person’s outer self, and good handwriting is an indicator of a person’s educational and cultural 
standing. To achieve good handwriting, one must first of all learn the correct stroke order of a 
character. Such ideology has been ingrained into the traditional teaching of Chinese literacy. 
Children in China are not only tested on correct character components, but also correct stroke 
orders. So when the ethnic Chinese students saw their teacher wrote Chinese characters on the 
white board with the wrong stroke order, they giggled amongst them. They also commented, 
privately, on the handwriting styles of the teachers and described some of them as ‘childlike’, 
‘ugly’, and most tellingly, ‘like a foreigner’s writing’. 
In general the so-called culture as represented in the Chinese language teaching in the 
Confucius Institutes and Classrooms is very basic and restricted largely to traditional customs 
and stereotypically Chinese symbols such as landmarks, festivals, and food. The expectation 
from both the teachers and the students is low; the teachers were not expected to teach much 
culture and the students were not expected to learn much either. Some of the teachers appear to 
know relatively little of the Chinese culture. The authenticity of the Chinese culture as presented 
by the teachers in class and as represented by the teachers themselves was brought into question 
by some of the students, especially by those ethnic Chinese students. 
In the next section, we want to focus especially on the ethnic Chinese students in the 
Confucius Institutes and Classrooms. We are particularly interested in how the promotion of 
Chinese as a global language has affected this group of learners and how the specific policies and 
practices of the CIs and CCs in the UK have impacted on them. 
 
The othering of Chinese learners 
Ever since the racial tensions between the Chinese and local communities in Southeast 
Asia in the 1950s, China has been extremely careful in keeping the so-called overseas Chinese 
affairs separate from either its internal or external matters. China does not recognise dual 
nationality, and China’s official line is that overseas Chinese who hold foreign passports are 
foreigners and would be treated the same as all other foreigners. There is a government-
supported national association for returnees and families of overseas Chinese. During the 1980s 
and 90s, the main job of the association was to raise funds from overseas Chinese to support 
construction and other projects, especially in the coastal areas of mainland China that are the 
main sources of Chinese immigrants.  
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Language maintenance in the Chinese diasporas has been a major issue of concern, but 
mainly amongst the overseas Chinese communities themselves. China has no specific policy in 
this area. Today there is a well-established global network of Chinese heritage language schools, 
variably called Chinese community schools or complementary schools. They are self-support, 
voluntary organizations set up by the overseas Chinese communities. When Hanban was set up 
to promote the teaching of Chinese overseas, it did not consider the large number of overseas 
Chinese and their descendants who are also in need of support especially in terms of textbooks 
and teacher supply. There is no official policy from Hanban regarding the inclusion of ethnic 
Chinese students in the CIs and CCs. The only relevant unwritten policy is about students from 
Taiwan. Following the Chinese government’s position, students from Taiwan would be welcome 
to take Chinese classes at the Confucius Institutes and Classrooms. However, as students from 
Taiwan generally know Mandarin, there is no need for them to attend CIs and CCs.  
In the earlier days of the Confucius Institutes and Classrooms in the UK, ethnic Chinese 
pupils and students were turned away because the managers and teachers assumed that they 
knew Chinese already and that it would be a waste of time for them to learn the very basics of 
the language. There was little appreciation of the sociolinguistic situation of the overseas Chinese 
communities and the language shift that they were experiencing. After the initial period, many 
CIs and CCs realised that they needed the ethnic Chinese learners to boost their recruitment 
numbers and that most of the ethnic Chinese students had little knowledge of Mandarin. Now 
every Confucius Institute and Classroom in the UK has some ethnic Chinese students and pupils. 
Many of them are British-born, but some are from other Chinese-speaking regions such as Hong 
Kong and Malaysia who are taking the opportunity to learn Mandarin. 
The presence of the ethnic Chinese learners in the Confucius Institutes and Classrooms 
is a challenge to the teachers and managers who are largely unprepared for the situation. When 
we asked them how they felt about having ethnic Chinese learners in the class, they all said it was 
difficult to manage. If the numbers were big enough, they would have separate classes for the 
ethnic Chinese students and the non-ethnic Chinese learners. In the meantime, the Chinese 
communities in the UK are unhappy that so much investment has been given to the Confucius 
Institutes and Classrooms while their own efforts of promoting Chinese through complementary 
schools are largely unsupported. In particular, they are unhappy about the expansion of 
Mandarin at the cost of Cantonese and other regional and community varieties of Chinese. 
Teachers of the Chinese complementary schools in the UK constantly complain about the fact 
that whilst the Cantonese schools all offer Mandarin classes, none of the Mandarin schools have 
Cantonese classes. Cantonese has traditionally been the lingua franca of the Chinese 
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communities in the UK. Community leaders have long argued that the maintenance of 
Cantonese would aid community cohesion, especially in the context of rapid generational 
language shift to English. Now a different variety of Chinese has been introduced into the 
community. But it is not shared by the majority of its people. Some community leaders have 
privately expressed an anxiety that the expansion of Mandarin may lead to segregation within the 
Chinese community between speakers of different varieties of Chinese, which would in the long 
run harm the community’s position in the British society. 
It is rather unfortunate that most of the managers and teachers of the Confucius 
Institutes and Classrooms in the UK seem to be unaware of the anxieties and concerns of the 
local Chinese communities. Many of them seem to hold on to the ideology that Mandarin is the 
national language China and every Chinese person should know it, whereas Cantonese and other 
varieties of Chinese are merely ‘dialects’ and their use should be confined to home and local 
contexts. One incident in the Confucius Classroom that we observed serves as a good case in 
point. The teacher, a female Mandarin volunteer in her mid-twenties, had asked the ethnic 
Chinese pupil in the Mandarin class to prepare a Chinese song to teach her classmates. When the 
girl came back to the class the following week and sang a song in Cantonese, the teacher was 
stunned because she could not understand it. Other non-ethnic Chinese children in the class 
then said to the Chinese girl that her song was not Chinese. The girl was very upset. But the 
teacher did not come to her defence. Instead she said that she would teach the class ‘a real 
Chinese song’ in Mandarin. We also observed on a number of occasions when ethnic Chinese 
students in the Confucius Institutes at universities wrote traditional, complex Chinese characters, 
the teacher marked them as ‘wrong’. 
Such incidents can have a devastating ‘othering’ effect on the ethnic Chinese learners. In 
fact, one of the ethnic Chinese students at a Confucius Institute said to us, 
 
‘She (referring to the teacher) treats us like foreigners. I suppose we are. But she thinks we 
don’t know Chinese at all. We don’t know Mandarin and we want to learn Mandarin. But 
we know some Cantonese. I can actually read some Chinese too.’ 
 
 There is no doubt that the promotion of Chinese through Confucius Institutes and 
Classrooms has raised awareness of China, the Chinese language and the Chinese culture 
amongst the general British public. But the specific focus on Mandarin has not helped to 
enhance community cohesion within amongst the Chinese in the UK. In fact, there is evidence 
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of an ‘othering’ effect of a significant numbers of ethnic Chinese people, who fell that they are 
being treated as foreigners by their own compatriots. 
What seems to be at stake here is who has the legitimacy to represent the authentic 
Chinese language and culture. Many of the teachers seem to assume that by virtue of being 
born and brought up in China they have a better understanding of what Chinese culture is 
and can represent it better than the immigrants and their children. The immigrants and their 
children, on the other hand, seem to feel that they have preserved the traditional Chinese 
culture better and regard the young teachers as rather naïve, or worse, have lost the Chinese 
tradition. The battle is sure to continue, as it is an issue facing all diasporas (see further 
Kramsch, 2012).  
 
Summary and Conclusion 
For centuries, China thought that its own culture and language was all it needed.  The 
shocks of foreign invasion and occupation of the 19th and early 20th century put that 
misconception to rest. Successive post-imperial governments in China have used a discourse of 
national humiliation to stir up nationalist sentiments (e.g. Callahan, 2004). In the 21st century, 
the world seems to be trying to learn Mandarin to further its chances of success in a new world 
order and to understand the basics of Chinese culture. China seems to have taken this global 
change to heart with huge investment in the Confucius Institutes and classroom worldwide. In 
promoting the language as soft power, China, through the Confucius Institutes and Classrooms 
is implementing its geopolitical strategy and creating vital space for stability, growth and long-
term gains through language. 
The funding and support that come with the CIs and CCs are particularly welcome. 
Chinese language teaching also seems to serve the UK government’s geopolitical strategies, as 
Britain wants to maintain her international role. The UK is competing directly with China in 
many of the former British colonies for resources and politico-cultural influence. The promotion 
of Chinese teaching is also timely as far as UK universities and schools are concerned, as there 
has been a major decline of the number of students taking modern foreign languages 
So far, however, very little attention has been paid to the implications of the proliferation 
of the Confucius Institutes and Classrooms for modern foreign language teaching and learning. 
Our study clearly shows that there are very different motivations for universities and schools to 
want to set up Chinese classes, for the teachers to teach in the CIs and CCs and for the students 
to choose to do Chinese. These different motivations may be due to different ideologies. But it 
seems that on the whole pragmatic and personal considerations are the key factors. Whilst the 
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policy makers for the promotion of Chinese through CIs and CCs would like to use the teaching 
of the Chinese language to promote the Chinese culture as well, in practice the cultural element 
taught by the teachers is restricted to fairly stereotypical customs and traditions. Some students 
even question the legitimacy and authenticity of the teachers as representatives of the Chinese 
culture, which raises an important yet hitherto under-explored issue of the role of the language 
teacher in mediating culture and cultural knowledge. In this regard, the status of the ethnic 
Chinese students is particularly interesting. Despite their heritage connections with China, these 
ethnic Chinese students have not been a main concern of Hanban’s policies. They are often 
treated in the same way as all other ‘foreign students’ learning Chinese. In some cases, the 
situation is worse, as the ethnic Chinese students are regarded as too troublesome to teach, 
requiring additional and specific attention from the teachers. They feel being ‘othered’ in the 
Confucius Institutes and Classrooms. 
In the meantime, the British universities and schools that host the CIs and CCs seem 
largely unaware of the ‘othering’ effect on the ethnic Chinese students. Of all the ethnic minority 
groups, the Chinese have traditionally done very well in the education system in the UK. And as 
such, they are often neglected by the policy makers. Should, then, the UK government and 
policy makers be concerned about the ‘othering’ of the ethnic Chinese students in the CIs and 
CCs? As UK nationals, they should definitely be a concern for the UK education authorities. But 
a much broader issue seems to be about the impact of language learning on community cohesion 
and community relations. The promotion of Mandarin, while welcomed from a global 
perspective, has been met with hostile reactions both in the so-called dialect speakers within 
China and increasingly in the Chinese diasporas. Some community leaders are voicing their 
concerns that their children are no longer able to communicate with the parents and 
grandparents, not because they speak English, but because they are now speaking Mandarin. One 
Chinese language’s gain seems to have led to another Chinese language’s loss. This surely should 
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